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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role private property  rights and ethics play
in a m arket economy, and  dem onstrates  that in o rder  to have a free
market, it is essential to have a legal system that defines private property  
rights. Such a legal system can only evolve on the free market itself.
Chapter I examines the nature of property rights.
Chapter II examines some historical examples of legal systems that 
have been based on private property rights.
Chapter III explains the relationship between such a legal system
and  ethics. An attem pt is m ade to justify such a system on the basis of
ethics.
C hapter IV explores the implications of the concept of private  
property.
Chapter V examines the characteristics of a legal system which is 
based on the concept of private property.
Finally, Chapter VI presents criticisms of some present ideas on 
p ro p e rty  rights and legal practices. M oreover, som e conclusions are 
presented.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPROVAL PAGE ii
ABSTRACT iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT v
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER I THE NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 5
CHAPTER II A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF CUSTOMARY 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 8
The Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea 8
Justice in the Old American West 10
Colonial Religious Com m unities 14
Ethnic Im m igrant Communities 16
M erchant Production of Commercial Law in the U.S. 17
Medieval Iceland 19
The Yurok Indians and their N orthern  Californian Neighbors 23
CHAPTER III PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ETHICS 27
CHAPTER IV IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF JUST PROPERTY 33
CHAPTER V FREE MARKET LAW 38
CHAPTER VI CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS 52
A Critique of the Chicago School's Ideas on Property Rights 52 
Some Additional Criticisms of Present Law 57
C onclusion  60
BIBLIOGRAPHY 62
i v
T h is  paper is dedicated to m y parents who 
have provided me iv iik  an im m ense  
am ount o f support, taught me 
the importance o f education , 
and enabled me to reach 
this point in m y life, 
a nd
to Professors Rothbard and Hoppe, zoho 
have provided me w ith a world o f  
knowledge and have changed  
m y way o f thinking.
I zvould like to express an enormous am ount o f 
gratitude towards Elizabeth Ramirez fo r  
showing me that it is not enough 
to merely read and write about 
ideas on ethics and private 
property rights, but it 
is more im portant 
to adopt them  
in one's life.
V
INTRODUCTION
L udw ig  von Mises, one of the p ioneers of the A ustrian  School of 
economics, was once asked how he w ould tell whether a nation was under a 
socialist regime. H e replied that the presence or absence of a stock m arket in a 
country w ould indicate whether that country is under a socialist regime or is 
a m arket economy — the presence of a stock market w ould  indicate a m arket 
economy, whereas its absence w ould indicate a socialist regime. That is, the 
presence of an intense m arket w ould  testify the nature  of the social and 
political s tru c tu re  and the way rights to resources are a llocated in an 
economy. Before any discussion of markets, exchange, and  trade can take 
place, a lot needs  to be said about the s truc ture  of p roperty  rights in an 
economy.
Property rights are the underpinnings of a free market economy. There 
cannot be freedom  without law and m arkets w ithout p roperty  rights. In 
o rder  for exchange to take place, goods and  services have to be ow ned. 
Buying and selling cannot occur if goods and services are not owned.
Private  property  rights are the form of property rights which are most 
essential in a m arket economy. For instance, if the state or governm ent 
ow ned  certain property  that w ould  still constitute a property  right, b u t  this 
form of property  right would be useless, in fact harmful, for the economy. In 
the case of a monarchy, for instance, w here specific individuals acquire the
status of elites, the ruling group of elites w ould  be the personal owners of 
property . Similarly, u n d e r  a system of collective governm ent ow nership , 
w here  the governm ent apparatus  is considered "public" p roperty  which is 
adm inistered by officials who are supposed to represent the people and who 
do  not personally ow n the government and thus property, the basic form of 
property  ownership is again that of ownership by the ruling elite. This is true 
because masses and majorities of people  cannot possibly possess na tura l 
au thority  (this being a personal, ind iv idual trait). Thus, such a form of 
governm ent can only acquire legitimacy unnaturally. Only in activities such 
as war or revolution can masses act collectively and  only in such activities do 
victory or defeat depend  on collective effort and hence, the "collective" form 
of governm ent can only gain legitimacy through w ar or revolution.1
Even if we were to assume that a system of collective ow nership  could 
be truly "collective" — that is, that governm ent and property  are ow ned by 
"the people" — it w ould  be impossible to im plem ent and m aintain  such a 
system. Under collective ownership, where everyone owns everything, there 
can be no exchange as no one person can exchange something that everybody 
owns. As a result, such a system would be impossible and, if implemented, 
w o u ld  have  to function  as a d ic ta to rsh ip , or som e o ther form of an 
authoritarian government, where the ruler would own property and  thus the 
m eans of p roduction . This, in fact, has been the case in m ost socialist 
economies.
U nder a system of authoritarian  ow nersh ip  of p roperty  that w ould  
arise th rough  collective ow nersh ip , all that is ow ned  is in the form of
1 For a d eta i led  a n a ly s is  see  H a n s -H e rm a n n  H o p p e ,  "Time Preference, G o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  the  
P r o c e s s  o f  D e -c iv i l i z a t io n  -  From M o n a rch y  to D em ocracy ,"  (m a n u sc r ip t ,  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  
N e v a d a ,  Las V egas) ,  pp . 24-54.
governm ent property  (or rather the property of the ruler), similar to the case 
of a monarchy. The major differences, however, betw een a m onarchy and 
this form of a dictatorship are:
(1) The dictator m ay be the sole owner and exploiter of property while under a 
monarchy there is usually a class of ruling elites with heirs, and government 
is handed  dow n from generation to generation.
(2) The dictator may have a higher time preference for the property  as he may 
not be able to own the governm ent for life, as opposed to a monarchy where 
the m onarchs usually gain "legitimacy" in the eyes of the people and may 
thus be able to pass dow n government to their heirs. As a result, the dictator 
m ay have less of an incentive to preserve the property  and would have every 
incentive  to consum e it w ith in  the period  of his ru le  as com pared  to 
m onarchs.
Dictators have every incentive to pay a value less than the fair market 
value for acquiring the property, or to confiscate it altogether. Therefore, this 
type of property  right would be harmful for the economy or the society as it 
w ould  lower the welfare of the previous owner of the property  for the benefit 
of the dictator. This form of acquisition of property  would  be parasitic for the 
economy. As the dictator has not paid a fair market value for the property, he 
does not have an incentive to be efficient with it. Moreover, as the dictator 
has a m onopoly  on coercion, he has every incentive to use this unfairly 
acquired property  in such a way that he could coerce m ore people through 
unfair means. For instance, if the dictator confiscated land and decided to use 
it to build  a m ansion for himself, he w ould  have the pow er to coerce more 
and  more people to provide him with materials and labor at low or no cost to 
complete his mansion.
4T hus, all form s of o w n e rsh ip  of p ro p e r ty  o th e r  than  p r iv a te  
ow nership , m ay they be monarchies, dictatorships, or collective ownership , 
w ou ld  even tually  boil dow n to au thorita rian  and coercive o w nersh ip  of 
p rope rty . N o th in g  need be explained  to p rove  w hy m onarch ies  and 
dictatorships are authoritarian, but in the case of collective ownership , if all 
p roperty  is collectively owned, then every person would have his ow n idea of 
the purpose for which the property is to be used. People have different tastes, 
preferences, and  subjective values. Therefore, there w ou ld  be constant 
disagreements over the use of the common property. As a result, a coercive 
au thority  w ou ld  have to step in to decide w hat has to be done w ith  the 
p ro p e r ty  tha t theoretically everybody owns. As indicated  earlier, this 
inherent impossibility of collective ownership is why all com m unist regimes 
throughout history have, in reality, merely been authoritarian dictatorships.
CHAPTER I 
THE NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property  rights specify the "norms of behavior" tha t  persons m ust 
observe while interacting with one another.2 In doing so, they "convey the 
right to benefit or harm  oneself or others."3 In other words, property  rights 
d ictate  the d istribution of wealth, and changes in p roperty  rights transfer 
wealth. In addition, the concept of property rights encompasses all law, even 
criminal statutes, which define or attenuate various "hum an rights" as well 
as r igh ts  over m aterial p roperty . G overnm ents  govern  by creating and 
enforcing rights and by modifying and changing rights as wealth transfers are 
institu ted .4
H ow  are property  rights enforced? The responsibility  of enforcing 
property  rights obviously goes to the legal system. This implies that a legal 
system is essential for the smooth functioning, in fact the very existence, of a 
free market. The main issue, however, is in w hat form should  a legal system 
exist. It has been stated earlier that p r iva te  property  rights are essential to
2 Eric F u rob o tn  and S v eto za r  P ejovich ,  "Introduction: T he  N e w  P ro p erty  Literature," T H E  
E C O N O M I C S  O F  P R O P E R T Y  R I G H T S ,  E. Furobotn  a n d  S. P e jo v ich  (ed .) ,  (C a m b rid ge ,  
M a ssach usetts :  Ballinger Publications , 1974), p. 3.
3 H a r o ld  D e m s e t z ,  " T ow ard s a T h e o r y  o f  P rop erty  Rights ," A M E R IC A N  E C O N O M IC  
REVIEW , Vol. 57, M ay 1967, p. 348.
4 B ru ce  L. B e n so n ,  "Rent S e e k in g  from  a P r o p erty  R ig h ts  P e rsp ec t iv e ,"  S O U T H E R N  
E C O N O M IC  JO U R NA L, N o . 51, October 1984.
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6ensure  a free market, and thus, the legal system should be of the type which 
ensures and guarantees private property  rights. It should seem logical that a 
legal system that enforces private property  rights would develop on the free 
m arket through the spontaneous order of hum an beings. In fact, that is how 
law  initially evolves.
Law consists of both rules of conduct and the mechanisms or processes 
for applying those rules. Individuals m ust have incentives to recognize rules 
of conduct or the rules become irrelevant, so institutions for enforcem ent are 
necessary. Law can be imposed from above by some coercive authority, such 
as a king, a legislature, or a supreme court, or law can evolve from the bottom 
as custom s and  practice evolve.5 C ustom ary  law, or law which evolves 
th ro u g h  custom s or the spon taneous  o rder  or evolution of society and 
civilization, is recognized in a society, not because it is backed by the pow er of 
som e strong indiv idual or institution, but because each ind iv idua l in the 
society recognizes  the benefits of behav ing  in accordance  w ith  o ther 
individuals' expectations, given that others also behave as he expects. On the 
other hand, when law is enforced or imposed coercively by a minority of the 
population from above, this law would require much more force to maintain 
social order, as opposed  to law which develops from the bottom  through 
m utual recognition and acceptance.
The basic source of both the recognition of the law  and  of its 
en fo rcem ent are  reciprocities in a custom ary  legal system . T hat is, 
individuals m ust "exchange" recognition of certain behavioral rules for their 
m utual benefit. Because of the fact that reciprocity is the basis for recognition
5 H arold  J. Berman, L A W  A N D  R E V O L U T IO N : T H E  F O R M A T I O N  O F  W E S T E R N  LEG A L  
T R A D I T I O N ,  (C am b ridge ,  M assachusetts: Harvard U nivers ity  Press, 1983), p. 274.
of the law in a customary legal system, private property  rights and the rights 
of individuals are m ost likely to be the ingredient of p rim e im portance in 
such a legal system. In fact, voluntary recognition of laws and participation in 
their enforcement is likely to occur only when substantial benefits from doing 
so can be internalized by each individual.6 U nder a legal system which is 
coercively im posed  from above, pu n ish m en t is usually  the threat that 
induces recognition of law. H owever, u n d e r  a custom ary system of law, 
incentives for the recognition of the law are usually  positive. "Individuals 
m ust expect to gain as much or more than the costs they bear from voluntary 
invo lvem ent in the legal system. Protection of personal p ro p e rty  and 
individual rights is a very attractive benefit."7 Bruce Benson further explains 
the na ture  of a customary legal system:
"Under a custom ary legal system, all offenses are treated as torts 
(private wrongs or injuries) instead of crimes (offenses against the 
state or the 'society')- A potential action by one person has to affect 
som eone else before any question of legality can arise; any action 
that does not, such as w hat a person does alone or in voluntary  
cooperation with someone else but in a m anner that clearly harms 
no one, is not likely to become the subject of a rule of conduct under 
customary law."8
6 B ruce L. B enson , T H E  E N T E R P R IS E  O F  LAW: J U S T IC E  W I T H O U T  T H E  S T A T E , (San  
Francisco , California: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy , 1990), pp . 12-13.
7 Ibid., p. 13.
8 Ibid., p. 13. 1 shall e x a m in e  this asp ec t  o f  a cu sto m ary  or a free market legal sy s tem  in m ore  
deta i l  in C hapter  V o f  this paper.
CHAPTER II 
A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF 
CUSTOMARY LEGAL SYSTEMS
The idea tha t custom ary  legal systems (that evolve w ith in  h u m an  
society from  the bo ttom  and up w ard s  th rough  the spontaneous o rd e r  of 
hum an  beings) enforce private property  rights and  are compatible w ith  the 
free market, can be witnessed by examining legal systems that have evolved 
am ong different societies through hum an history. Here I examine just a few 
such examples.
THE KAPAUKU PAPUANS OF 
WEST NEW GUINEA9
In 1954, Leopold  Popisil, a researcher, investigated  the K apauku  
Papuans of West N ew  Guinea. These people lived in the form of a primitive 
c ivilization liv ing  by  m eans of ho rticu ltu re . They func tioned  on an 
ingenious system of private property rights based on reciprocal arrangements.
The K a p a u k u  had  no fo rm al coercive  g o v e rn m e n t  au th o r i ty .  
However, every tribe had one influential person who was usually a healthy 
m an in the prim e of life who had accumulated a certain am ount of wealth. 
The concepts of individualism, physical freedom, and private property  rights
9 Ibid., pp . 15-20. See  a lso  L eop o ld  P opisil ,  A N T H R O P O L O G Y  O F  LAW: A  C O M P A R A T IV E  
T H E O R Y , ( N e w  York: H arper  and R o w  Publishers, 1971).
8
9w ere deeply rooted in the K apauku culture. Because of the fact that under 
such  a system  an ind iv idua l could only achieve influence and  wealth  
th rough hard  work and achievement, the influential person, or "tonowi" was 
usu a lly  a m a tu re  and  skilled pe rson  w ith  considerab le  physical and  
intellectual abilities. The very fact that the Kapauku considered a person with 
such  abilities influential show s the im portance these peop le  placed on 
individualism  and private property  rights. These people had absolutely no 
concept of common property in their culture.
Followers became debtors  to a tonowi in exchange for agreeing to 
perform  certain duties in support of the tonowi. The expectation of future 
favors and advantages was the strongest motivation for most of the tonowi's 
followers. Thus, the position of leadership was achieved through reciprocal 
exchange of support between the tonowi and his followers.
During a dispute, the victim and the defendant went to the tonowi and 
p leaded  their cases. Once a verdict was given by the tonowi, if the defendant 
did  not accept it he was considered an outlaw. In such a case, he was free to 
either be driven out of the area or killed. If the verdict was accepted, which it 
usually was, the defendant was punished according to the nature of the crime. 
Torture was not permitted under Kapauku law. Even when a defendant was 
sentenced to death, he was given the option to run and fight back while his 
pun ishers  hun ted  him with bows and arrows. The most popu la r  form of 
punishm ent, however, was economic sanctions.
K apauku  law changed and developed based completely on changing 
customs and  norms. Thus, this law evolved from the bottom and upw ards in 
a natural way. This is believed to be the main reason why resistance to the 
law and the verdict of the tonowi, and thus the society, was rare. The fact that
1 0
their law evolved through the spontaneous order of society, and developed 
on the free market with the absence of a coercive authority, makes this legal 
system most compatible with a free market economy.
JUSTICE IN THE OLD AMERICAN WEST
Between 1830 and  1900, m iners , fa rm ers , ranchers , and  o the r 
ind iv idua ls  m oved  faster to the Am erican W est than the United  States 
governm ent could expand its law enforcement. This, however, did  not leave 
the  A m erican West lawless and violent, contrary  to what m ost people  
believe. In the old Western societies, law and order was provided privately, 
and  the privately-run legal system was maintained because it functioned very 
efficiently. Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill concluded after considering several 
W estern non-governm enta l systems that the W estern frontier was not as 
wild as legends have led us to believe. The market provided protection and 
arb itra tion  agencies that functioned very effectively e ither as com plete 
replacements for or supplem ents to governm ent agencies.1(1 Similarly, Roger 
D. Me Grath concluded that "some long-cherished notions about violence, 
lawlessness, and justice in the Old West ... are nothing more than myths."11
According to several historians, the West was a place where a person 
could exist without worrying about tax-collectors, or law-makers. This lack of 
effective governm ent prom oted  a sense of ind iv idualism  and the lack of a 
social s tructure led the people of the Western frontiers to act independently  
and  to establish social relationships w ithout the fram ew ork of an existing
10 Terry A n d e r so n  and P. J. Hill ,  "An A m erican  Experim ent: T h e  N o t  So W ild , W ild  West,"  
JO U R N A L  OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES , N o .  27, Vol. Ill, 1979.
11 R oger  D. Me Grath, G U N F I G H T E K S ,  H I G H W A Y M E N ,  A N D  V IO L E N C E  O N  T H E  
F R O N T IE R ,  (Berkeley: U niv ers i ty  o f  California Press, 1984), p. 259.
11
order. Due to the fact that the w estw ard  im m igrant encountered no formal 
governm ent s tructure  as he m oved to the frontier, most h istorians assum e 
that Western society was disorderly and violent. Henry S. Drago, however, 
po in ted  ou t that there were cases of violent behavior in the Old West, but 
such cases w ere not very com m on.12 Most of the historical s tudies  of the 
W est d iscovered a great deal of social o rder in that society. William C. 
H olden  stud ied  the Texas frontier from 1875 to 1890 and found that many 
kinds of offenses were nonexistent.13 Citizens did not need to lock doors, and 
hospitality was widespread, indicating that citizens had relatively little fear of 
invasive violent offenses. Shootings occurred but they typically involved 
w hat the citizens considered "fair fights." Stage and train robberies occurred 
bu t these incidents were isolated from most citizens and caused them little or 
no concern.14
Most historians who hold that the American West was a violent place, 
jus t a ssum e that this was the case d u e  to the absence of an effective 
governm ent authority. Most of these historians do not seek to prove that this 
was actually the case, but merely start from the premise or assum ption that it 
was.
W. Eugene Hollon found that the Western frontier was a far more 
civilized, m ore peaceful and safer place than American society today .15 A
12 H e n ry  S. Drago, T H E  G R E A T  R A N G E  W A RS: V IO L E N C E  A N D  T H E  G R A S S L A N D S ,  N e w  
York: D o d d  Publishers, 1970).
13 W i l l i a m  C . H o l d e n ,  ''Law a n d  L a w l e s s n e s s  o n  th e  T e x a s  F r o n t ie r  1875 -1 89 0 ,"  
SO U T H W E ST E R N  HISTORICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 44, October 1940, pp. 188-203.
14 Ibid., p. 196.
15 W . E u g e n e  H o l lo n ,  F R O N T IE R  V IO L E N C E : A N O T H E R  L O O K , ( N e w  York: O xford
U niv ers i ty  Press, 1974), p. X.
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westerner "probably enjoyed greater security in both person and property than 
d id  his contemporary in the urban centers of the East."16
In several places in the W estern frontier local governm ents  were 
established to replace privately-produced law, and public police, such as 
sheriffs , w ere  ap p o in ted .  In several instances, h o w ev er ,  these law
enforcem ent officials were so ineffective or corrup t that they were soon 
replaced by privately-established law  and order. Consider the case of San 
Francisco. Most of San Francisco's laws during the 1840s and the early 1850s 
w ere developed through popular assemblies of citizens.17 Governmental law 
enforcement, which was constituted early, required that every accused person 
had  to be arrested by a public sheriff and had to wait for a trial in the next 
C ourt of Sessions, which met every two months at the county seat. Trials 
were  often delayed, and as jail facilities were very scarce, the defendants were 
d ischarged , in which case they had  plenty of op p o rtu n i ty  to escape.18 
W itnesses were required to pay their own expenses and due  to the delays, 
they d id  not wait for the trials.19 As the population of San Francisco grew 
during  the Gold Rush, the law and order situation got out of hand.
O n February 19, 1851, the owner of a San Francisco clothing store was 
robbed and beaten. The sheriff arrested two men and charged them. A large
16 Frank R. Prassel, T H E  W E S T E R N  PEA C E  OFFICER, (N o r m a n ,  O k lah o m a: U n ivers i ty  of  
O k la h o m a  Press, 1972), p. 72.
17 Terry A n d erso n  an d  P. J. Hill , "An A m erican  Experiment In A narcho-C apita l ism : T h e  N o t  So  
W ild ,  W ild  West", THE J O U R N A L  OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o .  27, Vol. Ill, 1979. See  
a lso  John R. U m beck , A  T H E O R Y  OF P R O PE R T Y  R IG H T S  W IT H  A P P L IC A T IO N  T O  T H E  
C A L I F O R N I A  G O L D  R U S H , (A m es ,  Iowa: Iowa State U nivers ity  Press, 1981); and Bruce L. 
B e n s o n ,  "The E v o lu t io n  o f  Law: C u s to m  V ersus A uthority ,"  (m a n u sc r ip t ,  Florida State  
U n iv e r s i ty ,  T a lla h a ssee ,  F lorida).
18 A llan  V alentine, V IG IL A N T E  JUSTICE, ( N e w  York: Reynnl and Co., 1956), p. 28.
19 Ibid.,  pp . 28-29.
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num ber of people gathered  the next day before the city offices, dem anding  
quick action against the accused. A committee of fourteen prom inent citizens 
was chosen to take charge of the case. The legal authorities were invited to 
participate, but they declined, although they raised no resistance and handed 
over the prisoners to the committee. The committee im paneled a jury and 
appointed three judges and  a clerk, and two "highly regarded" lawyers were 
appoin ted  to represent the prisoners. After hearing the case, the jury found 
the prisoners guilty and they were turned back over to the authorities.
In May 1851, a volunteer force was organized to assist city officers in 
ap p rehend ing  criminals, w ith the reluctant cooperation from the sheriff. 
This volunteer force, together with the citizen's committee was d isbanded in 
September 1851, but during  these few months the committee m ade 91 arrests 
and  crime had declined rapidly in San Francisco.20
Similar stories could be told about other communities in the American 
West. Henry Plummer, the sheriff of Banack, Montana, in 1863, was also the 
organ izer of "an in tricate  netw ork of bandits , agents, and h ideou ts  in 
southw estern  M ontana."21 Plummer participated in num erous robberies and 
w as responsible for several deaths. When the citizens finally organized their 
vigilante justice, they hanged Plummer and twenty-one of his gang, banished 
several others from the area, and frightened the rest off.
Generally, these types of vigilante m ovem ents involved law-abiding 
citizens enforcing the law and re-establishing order. Scholars who view these 
vigilante m ovem ents as lawless are victims of the false argum ent that law
20 Bruce L. B en son , T H E  E N T E R P R IS E  O F  LAW : J U S T IC E  W I T H O U T  T H E  S T A T E , (San  
Francisco, California: Pacific Research Institute for Public P olicy , 1990), p. 316.
21 Allan Valentine, V IG I L A N T E  J UST1CE, (N e w  York: Reynal and Co.,  1956), p. 78.
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and order can only be established by government. When the law is only what 
the governm ent says it is, these vigilante m ovements can easily be classified 
as lawless.
As m entioned previously, a law has to be established through custom 
or rec ip roc ity  w hich  can be m a in ta in ed  th rough  k insh ip , contract, or 
legislation. W hen the reciprocities are not m aintained, the recognition of a 
system of law  breaks down. "A sufficient b reakdow n m ust — if w e are to 
judge the m atter with any rationality at all — release men from those duties 
tha t has as their only reason for being, m ain ta in ing  a pa tte rn  of social 
in teraction  that has now been destroyed ."22 Such a b reakdow n  in the 
governm entally-backed legal system occurred in San Francisco an d  other 
places w here  vigilante action was taken. In such a situation, custom ary law 
prevailed and private arrangements arose to enforce the law.
COLONIAL RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
A nother exam ple of a h istoric  legal system which was based  on 
reciprocity and  custom was that of the early communities in the American 
colonies. The early settlers in the United States were escaping religious 
o pp ress ion  by the English g o v e rn m en t and  thus, after a rr iv ing  at the 
A merican colonies, broke all ties to their previous governm ent. In such a 
case, their ow n religious and moral standards served as legal standards. Such 
a legal system, which was based on religious morals, functioned through 
reciprocity  as each ind iv idua l 's  actions were influenced by his "eternal 
sa lva tion ."
22 Lon L. Fuller, T H E  M O R A L IT Y  OF LAW, ( N e w  H aven , Connecticut: Yale U n iv ers i ty  Press,  
1964), p. 157.
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The Puritan  com m unities generally chose m ediation when d isputes  
arose. The church obviously had jurisdiction over religious matters, bu t it 
also "resolved a variety of commercial and property disputes. These included 
questions of business ethics ...; land title disagreements; and as late as the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, allegations of the breach of contract and 
f r a u d ." 22 These d ispu tes  were resolved in congregation, and as these 
congregations involved all members of the com m unity, there was constant 
p ro v is io n  of in fo rm atio n , op in ion , and  ad m o n it io n ,  an d  thereby  a 
strengthening of the social order.
The church could neither arrest an offender nor confiscate his property. 
All that was done was that the offender was expelled or ostracized. Just the 
th re a t  of os trac ism  an d  excom m unica tion  w as suffic ien t to en su re  
compliance with the law.24 Thus, the legal system functioned efficiently on 
reciprocity.
Another such example is that of the Quakers of New England. These 
people had a firm belief in peace and they relied heavily on peaceful means to 
solve disputes. W hen a d ispute  arose, the victim asked the wrongdoer, in a 
very brotherly and calm way, to respect his rights. If the wrongdoer did not 
comply, the victim requested compliance in the presence of two or three 
"discreet judicious friends, who were expected to act justly and expeditiously 
to resolve all differences."25 If that did not work, the wrongdoer was asked to 
accept arbitration from a disinterested and impartial Quaker. If compliance
22 Jerold S. A uerbach, JU S T IC E  W IT H O U T  T H E  LAW?, ( N e w  York: Oxford U nivers i ty  Press,
1983), p. 23.
24 Ibid., p. 23.
25 Ibid., p. 30.
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was still not provided, the dispute  was referred to a m onthly meeting where 
arbitrators were provided. If the w rongdoer still did not comply, he was 
d isow ned  from the society. This threat of d isow nm ent ensured  compliance 
in m ost cases. The Quakers also arbitrated business disputes and the Quaker 
economic system was very m uch in the "capitalist" mold, based on private 
property  and  free enterprise.
ETHNIC IM MIGRANT COMMUNITIES
Chinese in urban Chinatowns, Scandinavians in Minnesota and North 
Dakota, as well as the Eastern Europeans and Jewish im m igrants to Eastern 
Am erican cities, all established their own legal orders outs ide  the federal, 
state, or local governm en t that supposed ly  ru led  over the geographic  
territories encompassing their communities.
As law in China was kinship-based custom at the time of the large 
n in e teen th  century  m igrations, the American C h ina tow ns  developed  a 
similar type of legal system. M erchant elders functioned as mediators for 
com m unities  of num erous clans and local associations. Each such g roup  
so lved  its internal d ispu tes  and  a Consolidated  Benevolent Association 
m ediated disputes between the different groups. "Ostracism, mixed with the 
sham e of public scrutiny (and no doubt an occasional threat), was a strong 
deterrent."26 This system of law and dispute resolution did not yield to state 
law enforcement until after World War II.
Similarly, the Jews of Europe treated their religious teachings as a legal 
s tructure . For them, the Talm ud and the Torah were law. Throughout 
Europe, the Jews m ain ta ined  a s trong desire for religious, cultural, and
26 Ib id ., p. 75.
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econom ic  au tonom y. Thus, they enforced  their ow n  law s th rough  
synagogues and  the Bet Din (rabbinical courts). The Bet Din specialized in 
resolving any kind of legal disputes.27
In N ew  York, the Jewish community prom oted the concept of Kehillah 
(community) to facilitate economic and cultural interaction. The Kehillah 
system set up  several d ispute resolution systems beginning with a Bureau of 
Industry  around 1910 which mediated to bring order to the clothing, fur, and 
millinery industry. The success of this bureau led to the establishment, by 
1914, of "a court of arbitration and netw ork  of ne ighborhood  arbitration 
boards to handle  the full range of commercial and religious disputes."28 This 
system was dom inant until after World War I. During the post-war period, 
the N ew  York Jewish community developed a variety of arbitration tribunals. 
One such tribunal, the Jewish Arbitration Court, resolved thousands  of 
d isputes  d u ring  the 1920s. This tribunal was funded  and staffed through 
philan thropic  and  professional support, and faced stiff com petition in the 
m arket for d isputes  from the Jewish Conciliation Court of America. These 
courts g radually  transformed into public courts as the Jewish com m unity 
absorbed into the rest of American society.
MERCHANT PRODUCTION OF 
COMMERCIAL LAW 
IN THE U.S.
Perhaps the best example of a legal system based on reciprocity is the 
developm ent of commercial law. As commerce and free trade is based on
27 Ibid., p . 76.
28 Ib id ., p. 80.
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voluntary  exchange, the concept of reciprocity acts as the underp inn ing  of 
commerce. A party  which is a buyer now may be a seller in the future. As a 
result, com m ercial law  w as almost com pletely  based  on rec iprocity .29 
Commercial law reflected business practices and customs, and its imposition 
in America was dom inated by private institutions throughout the eighteenth 
century.
There were several reasons for merchants establishing commercial law 
themselves. First, merchants wanted to be sure that legal practices reflected 
business practices and customs. Second, disputes in such situations involved 
several technical issues and  merchant arbitrators had the expertise to know 
the technicalities of the trade. Furthermore, arbitration and resolution in 
m erchant courts tended to be quicker and informal as opposed to public 
courts which were m arked  by bureaucratic delay. Speed was im portant in 
such disputes as it did not disrupt business functions for too long. "Not only 
d id  (public) courts, according to one New York merchant, dispense 'expensive 
endless  law;' they w ere  slow to develop  legal doctrine  that facilitated 
commercial developm ent."30
Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, public courts began to 
adopt merchant commercial law and private arbitration began to disappear, 
b u t  w henever the public system failed to function efficiently, privately-run 
commercial law reappeared  on the scene. A round the end of the nineteenth 
century, commercial law established by private merchants gained popularity 
again. "The stronger the regulatory state, the stronger the desire for spheres 
of voluntary activity beyond its control. The grow th  of the regulatory state
29 Ibid., pp . 43-44.
30 Ibid., p. 33.
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unsettled advocates of commercial autonom y w ho turned to arbitration as a 
shield against governm ent intrusion."31
MEDIEVAL ICELAND32 
Similar to the case of the early settlers of the American colonies is the 
case of the early settlers of Iceland. After the territory that is now  N orw ay 
came under the strong rule of a conqueror called Harald, about ten percent of 
the population moved west, in about 870 A.D., to what is now Iceland. In 930 
A.D., the Icelander settlers held an assembly at which they agreed  on a 
com m on legal system. These people decided that they could run  a very 
organized legal system without a king, as it was a powerful king that they had 
escaped from.
The Icelandic legal system revolved around a central figure which was 
a chieftain. A person could become a chieftain by acquiring a bundle of rights. 
This b u n d le  of rights was like priva te  property . The rights could be 
transferred by buying and selling. An individual could find a chieftain who 
was willing to sell his rights for a price and the buyer could then become the 
chieftain. The chieftain was the link between the people and the legal system. 
Before a person was to be sued, the plaintiff inquired who his chieftain was — 
just in the same way that today in order to sue someone you m ust find out 
w hat state the defendant is a citizen of to determine the court in which he has 
to be sued  in. The relationship between the chieftain and his subjects was a 
voluntary one. The chieftain did not ow n the land or property  of his subjects
31 Ibid., p. 101.
32 D a v id  F r ie d m a n ,  T H E  M A C H I N E R Y  O F  F R E E D O M : G U I D E  T O  A R A D I C A L  
C A P I T A L I S M ,  se c o n d  ed it ion ,  (La Salle, Illinois: O p en  Court P u b lish in g  Co., 1989), pp. 201 - 
208.
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like a feudal lord, and the subjects were free to chose between chieftains and 
to switch their chieftain to some other who is willing to have them.
The chieftain had the right to vote in the legislature and to pick out 
judges w ho decided legal cases. There were thirty-six judges on each court 
and  they were equivalent to present day jurymen. The court system in the 
medieval Icelandic legal structure included several levels which went up  to 
the quarter courts or fifth courts.
U nder this legal system there was only one "government" part-tim e 
employee. This employee was the lawspeaker who was elected for a three- 
year term. The lawspeaker presided over the legislature, memorized the law, 
gave legal advice, and once during his three-year term, recited the entire code 
of law at an annual assembly of people from all over Iceland which lasted for 
tw o weeks. During the recitation of the law code, if the lawspeaker omitted a 
pa rt  of the law and nobody objected, then that part of the law was eliminated 
from the code.
If an offender was sued and the court found him guilty, he was 
considered an outlaw  if he did not abide by the verdict. In such a case, the 
ou tlaw  was given a few weeks to get out of Iceland, and if he did not, he was 
free to be killed by the plaintiff without any legal repercussions. If his friends 
tried to defend him, they were violating the law and could be sued as well.
A claim for dam ages under the Icelandic legal system was a piece of 
transferable property . If the victim was weaker than the offender and  the 
offender could get away without paying dam ages to the victim, the victim 
could sell his claim to a stronger person who was willing to buy it. The new 
ow ner of the claim now had the responsibility to collect the damages from the 
offender, in the process establishing his reputation for use in future conflicts.
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At the sam e time, the victim got part or all of his damages and he established 
his reputation to reflect that anyone who did him wrong would pay.
Unlike the present legal system where civil law is enforced privately 
and  criminal law is enforced by the government, under  the Icelandic legal 
system all law was civil law and was enforced privately. When a weak victim 
sold his claim to a stronger party for part of the damages, it was similar to the 
m odern  practice of the plaintiff agreeing to split the dam ages with his lawyer 
ins tead  of paying him a fee. C onsider the following quote  from David 
Friedm an.
"Because the Ice land ic  sy s tem  re lied  e n t ire ly  on  p r iv a te  
enforcement, it can be seen as a system of civil law expanded  to 
include what we think of as criminal offenses. It is similar to our 
civil law in another sense as well. Under our system, the loser of a 
civil case typically, although not inevitably, ends up  paying money 
dam ages to the winner; the loser of a criminal case typically ends up 
w ith  a non-m onetary payment, such as a jail term; or in extreme 
cases, execution. U nder the Icelandic system the typical settlement 
was a cash paym ent to the victim or his heirs. The alternative, if 
you lost your case, was outlawry. The payment for killing someone 
was called 'wergeld' -- man gold."33
D avid Friedm an estimates that the paym ent for killing an ordinary  man was
between 12.5 and 50 years of an ordinary man's wages.34
This legal system m ade a distinction between a m urderer and a killer. 
If a pe rson  killed som eone and  im m ediately  adm itted  to it in front of 
witnesses, he was classified as a killer. If he ran away and hid from the law, 
he w as a m urderer. The "wergeld" paid by a killer corresponded  to the 
p u n is h m e n t  im p o sed  to d ay  on a m u rd e re r  w ho  tu rn s  h im self  in
33 Ibid., p. 204.
34 Ibid., p. 203. S ee  a lso  D a v id  F r ied m an ,  "Private C reation  an d  E n fo rce m en t  o f  Law,"  
JO U R N A L  O F  LEGAL. STUDIES, June 1984.
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immediately after the deed. By committing a m u rd e r  in the Icelandic system, 
the defendant forfeited all justifications, such as self-defense, that m ight have 
m ade the action legal.
This system collapsed in the th ir teenth  century, m ore than  three 
hundred  years after its establishment. The collapse was preceded by a period 
of about fifty years of severe violence. It is estimated that during  the final 
period of the collapse, deaths due to violence totaled about 350. That comes 
up  to 7 deaths a year in a population of about 70,000, i.e., one death  per ten 
thousand per year.35 This is comparable to the highway death rate, or to the 
combined rates for m urder and non-negligent m anslaughter in the United 
States today. This suggests that even during what is considered to be the final 
period  of the b reakdow n  of the Icelandic system, their society w as not 
substantially more violent than society today.
O ne possibility  for the b reakdow n of the Icelandic legal system, 
according to David Friedman, is the increase in the concentration of wealth 
and  pow er in the hands of the few which m ade the system unstable. But 
perhaps the most im portan t reason is that the society of medieval Iceland 
started to get p lagued by an outlandish ideology known as monarchy. This is 
evident by the fact that disputes during the final period of breakdown were no 
longer over w ho ow ed whom what, but over who was to rule Iceland.
Thus, when enforcement of law is entirely private, it does not depend 
"on en fo rcem ent by an organ ization  with special rights  beyond  those 
possessed by all individuals. Private enforcem ent agencies are a m ore
35 Ibid., p. 207.
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formalized version of the arrangem ents by which individuals and coalitions 
in Iceland used force to protect their rights."36
THE YUROK INDIANS AND THEIR 
NORTHERN CALIFORNIAN 
NEIGHBORS
Walter Goldsmidt, an anthropologist, s tud ied  the Yurok, H upa, and 
Karok Indian tribes in 1951. In his study he discovered that the structure of 
these societies was rem arkably  like that of capitalistic Europe which was 
em erging about the same time that these tribes existed.37 In this primitive 
society, property was held by everyone in the form of private property titles. 
These Indians were organized in households and villages and there was no 
"state-like governm ent with coercive power."38
Private property  rights were defined completely in this society on the 
following basis: (1) there was a separation of title to different types of
products; (2) there were ow nership  rights within the territory of a foreign 
g roup  (for example, the H upas owned property  inside Yurok territory); (3) 
there was a division of title between persons (for example, a fishing place 
could be owned by several people and its use could be divided such that one 
person used it one day, another the next, and so on). These ownership titles
36 Ibid., p. 208.
37 W alter  G o ld sm id t ,  "Ethics and  the Structure o f  Society: A n E thnologica l C ontribution  to the  
S o c io lo g y  o f  K now ledge,"  A M E R IC A N  A NTH R O PO LO G IST, N o .  53, O ctob er  - D ecem b er  1951, 
p p .  506-524.
38 B ru ce  L. B en son , "E nforcem ent o f  P rivate  Property  R ights  in P r im it iv e  S oc ie t ies:  Law  
W ith o u t  Governm ent,"  JO U R N A L  OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o .  I, W inter  1989, p. 7.
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w ere totally transferable and this exchange of ownership was facilitated by a 
m onetary  system.39
U nder this legal system, if a plaintiff wanted to process a legal claim; he 
w o u ld  hire two, three, or four "crossers;" w ho w ere  nonrela tives from a 
com m unity  other than his own. The defendant also hired his ow n crossers, 
and  this entire group of crossers w ould  act as go-betweens, w ould  ascertain 
claims and  defenses, and  w ould  gather evidence.40 After hearing all of the 
evidence, these crossers would render a verdict. The crossers, in the process 
of settling disputes, on occasions also m ade new rules, in the same way as 
today judges set precedents that become part of the law.
The Yurok legal system recognized several offenses "ranging from 
m urder, adultery, theft, and poaching to curses and minor insults."41 Due to 
the absence of a formalized social unit, all offenses in this legal system were 
against the person, and thus can be classified as torts. Just as in the medieval 
Icelandic legal system examined earlier, all punishm ent for offenses was in 
the form of a paym ent in terms of money or property. As law was in the 
form  of torts, and there was no governm ent, "order prevailed  through the 
consistent effort of each person to serve his own self interest."42
The crossers' verdicts were enforced due to the threat of ostracism, and 
any offender who failed to pay damages automatically became the wage slave
39 Ibid., p . 8.
40 Ibid., p . 8.
41 W alter G o ld sm id t ,  "Ethics and  the Structure o f  Society: An E thnologica l C on tr ib ution  to the  
S o c io lo g y  o f  K now ledge ,"  A M E R IC A N  A N T H R O PO L O G IST , N o . 53, O ctob er  - D ecem b er  1951,  
p. 512.
42 R obert  R e d f ie ld ,  "Primitive Law," L A W  A N D  W ELFARE, Paul B o h an a n  (ed.) , (C arden  
C ity , N e w  York: The Natural H istory Press, 1967), p. 8.
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of the plaintiff. If the offender did not submit to this, he became an outcast or 
an outlaw  and could be killed without any legal repercussions. This threat of 
violence d id  not imply that violence was common. Rather indiv iduals  
avoided violence as much as possible. The threat of ostracism was viable 
because each man was a member of a "sweathouse group," which was a group 
of m en  from  three  or four n e ig h b o rin g  houses  w ho  socia lized  and 
participated in rituals.43 These men were free to join any sweathouse group 
they wished with the acceptance of the other members in that group.
W hen an offender did not accept the verdict of a crosser on a claim of 
one of the m em bers of the sw eathouse  group, the other m em bers of the 
g roup  backed this plaintiff's (fellow member's) efforts for physical retribution. 
The members did this because they believed that they could also be in such a 
s ituation in the fu ture  and w ould require other members' support. Bruce 
Benson explains this process in more detail as follows.
"The arrangem ents  were voluntarily entered into. An indiv idual 
exchanged a commitment to support others in the case of a legal 
d is p u te  for the e q u iv a len t  co m m itm en t from those  o th e r  
individuals for the same support should he find himself in such a 
dispute. And finally, the arrangement was symmetrical in the sense 
that each individual had strong incentives to support anyone in his 
g roup  in the event of a d ispute  because he realized that he m ight 
requ ire  the sam e kind of backing in the fu ture  w hen his ow n 
property  rights might be threatened. The fact that men voluntarily 
en te red  in to  such reciprocal a r ran g em en ts  im plies  that the 
accompanying duties were clearly spelled out and generally fulfilled 
when a dispute arose."44
43 W alter G o ld sm id t ,  "Ethics and the Structure o f  Society: An E thnological C on tr ib u tion  to the 
S o c io lo g y  o f  K n ow led ge ,"  A M ER IC A N  A N T H R O P O L O G IST , N o .  53, O ctober  - D ecem b er  1951, 
p. 512.
44 B ruce L. B en son ,  "E nforcem ent o f  P rivate  P ro p erty  R ights in P r im it iv e  S oc ie t ies:  Law  
W ith o u t  G overnm ent,"  JO U R N A L  O F  LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o . 1, W inter 1989, p. 10.
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Thus, these Indian tribes functioned efficiently th rough a privately  
enforced system  of p riva te  p roperty  rights. This system w as based  on 
reciprocal arrangem ents , as m ost custom ary law  is, and "well-established 
arbitration arrangements, with established legal sanctions backed by the treat 
of ostracism and, ultimately, physical retribution."45
45 Ib id ., p . 11.
CHAPTER III 
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ETHICS
P roper ty  r igh ts  and  legal system s are deep ly  roo ted  in ethics. 
Respecting one's p ro p e r ty  rights forms the basis of ethical an d  m oral 
ph ilosophy. Most m oral s tandards , including religion, are based on the 
respect for fellow man, and  m ost legal system s today are based on the 
foundation of moral and ethical standards that have evolved due to centuries 
of evolu tion . The first law code, w ritten  by H am m u rab i,  an ancient 
M esopotam ian ruler, about four thousand years ago, claimed that killing or 
h a rm ing  others was w rong and should be punished. Thus, over the years, 
h u m an  civilizations have taken these basic laws as natural (part of "natural 
law").
The free m arket and ethics go hand in hand. Just as we established 
earlier that in order to have a free market private property  rights have to be 
defined, the free market functions smoothly according to its own system of 
rules and regulations once these private property rights are defined. Under a 
system  w hich guarantees  p riva te  property  rights, a p e rso rv h as  com plete  
ow nership  of his own body, his ow n skills, and all labor that he derives from 
those skills. If that is the case, then a person should  also have complete 
ow nersh ip  of the p roduct of his labor. This includes land  and all natural
27
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resources tha t he cultivates th rough his own labor. This person  w ould 
specialize in the skills that he is best at and would exchange the fruits of his 
labor with that of another person's labor. All forms of ow nership  boil down 
to the ow nersh ip  of a person of his self and the land and resources that he 
cultivates with his skills, in a free society.46
Thus, the free m arket is no th ing  but a society of vo lun tary  and 
consequently  m utually  beneficial exchanges of ow nersh ip  titles between 
specialized producers. I exchange my skills and products for your skills and 
products that I value. Thus, contrary to the belief that the free market rests on 
the wicked doctrine that labor is a commodity, the free market is based on the 
natural fact that, as in the case of tangible properly, one's own labor service 
can be a lienated and exchanged for other goods and services. Although, 
however, one's labor service is alienable, his will is not. This means that a 
person can sell his labor service for money — whether it be a teacher who sells 
his teaching services to a student or a worker who sells his labor to a capitalist 
for wages.
Because of the fact that a person 's  will is his or her's inalienable 
property, the labor service can be alienated but the capitalized future value of 
the service cannot be sold by that person. In other words, a person cannot sell 
himself into slavery and have this sale enforced, as this would mean that his 
future will over his own person was being surrendered in advance. A person 
can na tu ra lly  expend his labor for someone else's benefit but he cannot 
transfer himself, even if he wished, into another person's capital good. If he
46 For an  in terest ing  d iscuss ion ,  s e e  Murray N . Rothbard, T H E  E TH IC S OF LIBERTY, (Atlantic  
H ig h la n d s ,  N e w  Jersey: H u m a n it ie s  Press, 1982), pp. 35-41).
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were to do so, he would not be able to rid himself of his own will which may 
change in future years and repudiate the current arrangement.
Thus the concept of voluntary slavery is contradictory. As long as the 
laborer voluntarily remains subservient to his master, he is not a slave as his 
subm iss ion  is voluntary. If he later changed his m ind  and  the master 
enforced the slave contract by violence, the slavery w ould not be voluntary. 
Therefore, the free market is based on property titles that are founded on the 
basic natural rights of hum an beings over their own persons, their own labor, 
and  over the land resources which they transform.
A purely free market exists when ownership and property titles are not 
d is tr ibu ted  bu t are acquired through labor and hom esteading, and these 
p roperty  rights or titles are not molested. As a result there is specialization, 
exchange, and thus harmony, sociability, and greater productivity. In such a 
society, the freedom to steal or to aggress would not be a state of freedom at all 
because it w ould  violate the freedom and the properly right of the victim.
The ethic of liberty is universal. Every human being has a basic need to 
be free and  to use his talents and resources in the most optimal way that he 
sees fit. Freedom not only implies freedom of will and action but also the 
freedom  to ow n a title or property  right to one's own body, skills, and the 
rew ard  one derives from those skills. Only a purely free and libertarian 
society, w ith o u t  an au thority  which has a m onopoly  on coercion, can 
g u aran tee  everyone 's  rights w ithout molestation. As long as there is a 
coercive authority, rights of someone or the other would be violated.
A purely  free market, then, is naturally based on ethics through the 
enforcement of property rights. Moreover, ethical behavior arises as a direct 
result of the functioning of the free m arket as noted earlier, for example,
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through the reciprocal nature of transactions. In a purely free society, ethical 
and  m oral s tandards  are enforced through firm private p roperty  rights and 
binding contracts. In such a society, promises would only be enforced if they 
are in the form of binding contracts, for instance. If person  A agrees to 
transfer $1,000 to person B for $1,100 in a year, the contract is not enforceable 
because A p rom ised  to pay B, but because A transferred title to $1,000 to B on 
the condition that he receives $1,100 from B in a year. Therefore, although 
keeping a prom ise would be a morally righ t thing to do, it w ou ld  not be 
legally enforceable until it is in the form of a binding contract.47
Similarly, if a paren t prom ises to pay a child a certain am o u n t of 
m oney regularly for college, it would not be an enforceable "promise" until 
title of present or future money has been transferred. If du ring  the child's 
college education the parent stops providing the periodic allowance, maybe 
due  to financial problems, the child w ould  not be able to collect from the 
parent, unless the parent had signed a contract where the child w ould  gain 
education on the condition that the parent paid for the education.
The ethics of a private property rights system is a concept that has been 
understood for centuries. Attempts have been made to justify a system based 
on priva te  p roperty  rights through an objective set of ethical and  moral 
standards. A major scholar who dem onstrated this was John Locke. Locke, a 
prom inent political philosopher of the seventeenth century, in his 1688 book 
The Second Treatise  on Governm ent, points out that land and all the nature 
which is associated with that land is provided  by God for hum an  beings to 
share. Thus, this nature  is communal property  and it has to be apportioned 
am ong people  in some objective and  just way. The most ethical way of
47 Ibid., p p . 133-135.
dividing land and nature, that is assigning property  rights to it, is by, w hat is 
now  called, hom esteading. A person who mixes his labor and  transform s 
na tu ra l resources in to  useful and consum able  goods, w ith  an "intrinsic 
value," should  have a private p roperty  right on that part of the natura l 
resources. Thus, he would also have a property  right to all the revenue he 
would derive from exchanging or selling the product of his labor.48
Thus, as much as the individual is willing to work and insofar as he 
works to "till the soil" and transforms goods ou t of natural resources, the 
more property  rights he would have to the natural resources he works with 
and to the fruits of his labor. In the process, he would also increase the total
wealth of society by increasing the number of goods and services produced.
Locke explains that by this logic, any person who holds the objection 
that a person has acquired "too much" property  through hom esteading  and 
should  be stopped, violates the property  rights of the homesteader. Thus, 
such an act should be considered unethical. Locke states:
"As m uch as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use 
the p roduct of, so much is his property. He by his labor does as it 
were enclose it from the common... God, when he gave the world 
in com m on to all mankind, com m anded man also to labour, and
the penury  of his condition required it of him. God and reason
com m anded him to subdue the earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit 
of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his 
labour. He that, in obedience to this com m and of God, subdued , 
tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that 
was his property, which another had no title to, nor could w ithout 
injury take from him... God gave the world to men in common; 
b u t since he gave it them for their benefit, and  the grea test 
conveniencies of life they were capable to draw  from it, it cannot be 
s u p p o se d  he m ean t it shou ld  a lw ays  rem ain  com m on  and  
uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational
4 8 John Lockc, T H E  S E C O N D  TREA TISE O N  G O V E R N M E N T , J. W. C o u g h  (ed.), (O xford , UK: 
Basil B lack w ell  P u b lish in g  Co., 1966), pp. 14-27.
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(and labour was to be his title to it), not to the fancy or covetousness 
of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had  as good left for his 
im provem ent as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought 
not to m eddle with what was already im proved by another's labour; 
if he did, 'tis plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which 
he had no right to,..."49
Locke explains that civilizations have historically come about due  to 
the  principle  of hom esteading. W hen hum an  beings transform and labor 
w ith  the nature  around  them, which is initially unow ned property, p roperty  
rights become more clearly defined. Locke explains this concept by relating it 
to religious scriptures.
"For we see in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and 
therefore like to be the best peopled , even as low d o w n  as 
A braham 's time they w andered with their flocks and their herds, 
which were their substance freely up and down; and this Abraham  
did in a country where he was a stranger: whence it is plain that at 
least a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants 
valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they m ade use 
of. But w hen there was not room enough in the same place for 
their herds to feed together, they by consent, as Abraham  and Lot 
did (Gen. xiii. 5), separated and enlarged their pasture w here it best 
liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his father and 
his brother, and planted in Mount Seir (Gen. xxxvi. 6)."~sl)
49 Ibid.,  pp. 17-18, paras. 32-34.
50 Ibid., p. 21, para. 38.
CHAPTER IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
OF JUST PROPERTY
From  this Lockean idea  of "first o w n e rsh ip  to first use" (the 
hom esteading  principle), w here  each man owns the land that he mixes his 
labor with, and thus owns the products of such labor which he has complete 
right to exchange or give out as gifts, we can derive certain conclusions. If 
this m ethod  of assigning private property rights is just and  ethical, then any 
a t tem p t to violate such a principle, that is the r igh t to the hom esteaded  
property , w ould be considered to be wrong and unethical. The most obvious 
cases' of aggression against one's just property  — which are stealing, forcibly 
invading one's property, trespassing, physical aggression against a person (as a 
person 's  body is his property), and destroying one's property  -- are easily 
unde rs tood  as immoral and  unethical in most societies. Let us, however, 
examine the more subtle cases such as air and noise pollution.
Excessive noise can be considered to be a form of aggression against 
one's property  right, as it hinders the enjoyment of his or her own property. 
Consider an example where an airport is built in a certain area around which
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there is a large am ount of empty land.51 The traffic of airplanes w ould  create 
a certain am ount of noise over the surrounding  area. If later the surrounding 
land is bough t by a hom e-developer, hom es are built, and  hom e-ow ners 
m ove in, can the hom e-owners later hold the airport liable for the noise? 
The answ er is no, because by buying the land first the airport has earned the 
right to use the land for its operations, the noise being a necessary part of 
them. W hen the home-owners bought the property around the airport, they 
should  have anticipated the noise level and thus should have been prepared 
to accommodate to it. Any attem pt to hold the airport liable for the existing 
noise w ould  be aggression against the just property right of the airport. By 
buying the land first, the airport has earned an "easement right" to create the 
noise in the surrounding  area. If the airport, however, increased the noise 
level after the hom e-ow ners  m oved  in, to a level h ig h e r  than they 
anticipated initially, the airport should be held liable for noise pollution over 
and  above the anticipated level.52
Let us now  consider air pollution. There is a certain am ount of air 
po llu tion  that continually goes on th rough natural sources, for instance, 
w hen volcanoes erupt or even when hum an beings breathe! Therefore, it can 
be said that air pollution is only a problem  when it harm s som eone or 
reduces his enjoyment of his property. Just as every object in the world 
emanates low-level radiation, radio waves cross our properties all of the time. 
Does this mean that we should ban all radio transmission and pu t severe 
restrictions on all things that let out low levels of radiation? Absolutely not,
51 For an in tere s t in g  d is c u ss io n ,  s ee  M urray N . Rothbard, "Law, P rop erty  R igh ts ,  an d  Air  
Pollution," E C O N O M I C S  A N D  T H E  E N V I R O N M E N T :  A R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  Walter E. 
Block (ed.) ,  (V an cou v er ,  British C olu m bia ,  Canada: T h e  Fraser Institute, 1990), p p .  248-249.
52 Ibid., pp . 248-249.
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as this radiation is undetectable and totally harmless. Thus, the only time air 
pollution is a problem  is when it physically harms someone or h inders his or 
her enjoyment of private property.
By this token, we would define invasion of private property not simply 
as crossing a boundary, bu t crossing a boundary  in such a way as to interfere 
w ith  the ow ner 's  en joym ent of his p roperty . In the case of low-level 
radiation, then, the radio station which initially owns a piece of land w ould 
have an easem ent right to radio waves as far as necessary w ithout harm ing 
anyone’s property .55
Air pollution, such as noxious odors, smoke, or other visible matter 
that can be sensed  by hum an  senses, which does harm other people and  
hinders their enjoyment of their private property, should constitute invasion 
of a private property  right, unless there is a "homesteaded" easement right to 
the air pollution. No one has the right to clean air, but one does have the 
right not to have his air invaded by pollutants.54
With the above factors in mind, how should private property  rights be 
assigned? The just m e thod  of assigning or recognizing private  p roperty  
rights, in the light of the above-mentioned factors then, would be to own a 
"technological unit" of property. That is, if resource X is owned by A, then A 
m ust ow n enough of it so as to include necessary appurtenances. In the case 
of the rad io  s tation, "the extent of o w n ersh ip  should  d ep en d  on the 
technological unit of the radio wave — its w id th  on the electrom agnetic  
spectrum, so that another wave would not interfere with the signal, and its
53 Ibid., p. 252.
54 Ibid., p. 253.
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length over space."55 The ow nership  is thus determ ined by w idth , length, 
and  location. M urray  Rothbard explains the concept further th rough the 
following example.
"... the hom esteading  provision in the federal land law of 1861 
provided  a unit of 160 acres, the clearing and use of which over a 
cer ta in  te rm  w ould  convey o w n ersh ip  to the  ho m estead er .  
Unfortunately , in a few years, w hen the dry prairie  began to be 
settled, 160 acres was m uch too low for any viable land  use 
(generally ranching and grazing). As a result, very little western 
land  cam e into p riva te  o w nersh ip  for several decades. The 
resu lting  overuse of the land caused the destruction of w estern  
grass cover and much of the timberland."56
In contrast to the principle of technical unit, the common law principle 
in such a case is that every land-ow ner owns the a irspace above him 
indefinitely into the heaven and dow nw ard  to the center of the earth. As can 
be imagined, this principle would create a lot of problems. No aircraft would 
be able to fly, and  no space travel and exploration w ould  take place as 
millions of people's property rights in airspace would be violated. U nder the 
hom esteading criterion, the common law principle does not m ake any sense. 
If one hom esteads and uses the soil, in what sense is he also using the sky 
above him  into heaven? Obviously, he is not.
So far the  only p rope rty  r igh t theory that comes close to the 
hom esteading principle is the "zone" theory, which states that a person owns 
the lower part of the airspace above his land. This airspace is enough to help 
the property-ow ner enjoy his property  completely. The extent of the space 
depends on the nature of the property. These final notes brings m e to the
55 Ibid., p. 254.
56 Ibid., p. 254.
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next section of the paper which explores free m arket legal systems in more 
detail and attempts to explain what law is best suited to a free market.
CHAPTER V 
FREE MARKET LAW
As explained  earlier, clearly defined p ro p e r ty  r igh ts  are critical 
requ irem en ts  for the functioning of a m arket system. Some system  of 
defining, protecting and enforcing property  rights is required before a free 
m arke t can develop. "When p roperty  rights are ass igned  to the 'public' 
ra th e r  than  to p riva te  ind iv idua ls ,  people  not only  have  incentives to 
overuse the common pool service, they do not have incentives to invest in 
inpu ts  as replacements for the services they consume... A ppropriate  private 
assignm ents of property rights (eg., recognition that crimes are torts and the 
victims should  have the right to restitution) w ould  elim inate many of the 
u n d e rin v es tm en t incentives."57
It is suggested that this enforcement of private p roperty  rights would 
require  coercion, and as governm ent is the only entity w hich w ould  have 
such s trong  coercive powers, such a system w ould only be p rov ided  by 
governm ent authority. While it is certainly true that a plausible threat is 
necessary to comply with laws and a court's judgment, as We have seen, this 
threat does not have to come from the government. It can be in the form of
57 Bruce L. B enson , T H E  E N T E R P R IS E  O F  LAW: JU ST IC E  W I T H O U T  T H E  S T A T E , (San  
Francisco, California: Pacific R esearch institu te  for Public Policy, 1990), pp. 275, 276.
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ostracism , d isow nm ent, or simply reciprocity. We have seen from  our 
exam ination  of custom ary legal systems that just because the threat of 
violence underlies any system of laws, violence need not be the only threat 
which ensures compliance in a legal system.
A nother justification often provided for the governm ent provision of 
law is that because the establishment of laws and the m echanism for their 
enforcem ent has the external effect of allowing the m arket econom y to 
develop and function, no private  individual engaged in the production  and 
enforcement of law would be able to charge for all the benefits the law would 
generate and thus too few laws would be developed on the free market. Yet 
another justification provided for the governm ent production  of the law is 
tha t no ind iv idua l w ould w ant to give another ind iv idua l au thority  to 
coercively enforce a system of property rights.
However, as we have seen, legal systems which guarantee and  enforce 
private property  rights have and usually do develop on the free market. We 
have also seen that the provision of a foundation for the free m arket is not an 
external benefit bu t the primary function of a legal system. If p roperty  rights 
are clearly defined and assigned to private individuals, then there  is no 
question of externalities arising.55 Thus, law will develop according to the 
d e m an d  for it; tha t is, w henever society requires rules for its sm ooth 
functioning law will evolve in an am ount exactly equal to what is required, 
through the spontaneous order of hum an beings.
Moreover, under customary or free market law, as we have seen, legal 
(or coercive) authority is not arbitrarily provided to an individual or a group
55 R onald  C oase ,  "The Problem of Social Cost," JO U R N A L  OF LAW A N D  E C O N O M IC S, N o .  1, 
October 1961, pp. 1-44.
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b u t it is voluntarily p rovided  for some reciprocal benefit or on the basis of 
personal achievements or accomplishments by the citizens of a com m unity. 
Thus, it is completely possible to have a legal system produced and enforced 
on the free market. In fact, such a legal system, as we have seen, is m ost 
conducive to the free m arket system. "Public courts are more likely to create 
uncerta in ty  and  litigation than are p riva te  courts ."59 Furtherm ore , the 
principles of free society do imply a theory of property  rights, which is self­
ow nership  and the ow nership  of resources discovered and transform ed with 
on e ’s labor (the Lockean idea). Thus, a governm ent authority, contradictory 
to the market, is not required to define or to allocate p roperty  rights.60 
Politically dictated rules are not defined to support the market process. In fact, 
they do just the opposite  — no free market is compatible with a law-m aking 
process centralized by authorities.61
We have  seen that privately  developed  and  enforced system s of 
custom ary  law have  developed, th roughout history, in various societies. 
This is evidence of the fact that throughout history, custom and tradition has 
been  m ore  im p o r tan t  in de te rm in in g  ru les  of conduct than  w ri t ten  
constitu tions and  legislation. The evolution of custom ary law has been 
com pared  to the developm ent of language. Just as language develops  
through the spontaneous order of hum an beings and their need to engage in 
cooperation  and  in teraction  with o ther h u m an  beings, cus tom ary  law
59 Bruce L. B en son , T H E  E N T E R P R IS E  OP LAW: J U S T IC E  W I T H O U T  T H E  S T A T E , (San  
Francisco, California: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy , 1990), p. 281.
60 M urray N .  Rothbard, P O W E R  A N D  M A R K ET : G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  T H E  E C O N O M Y ,  
(K ansas City, Kansas: S liced A n d r e w s  and Me Meel, Inc., 1970), p. 3.
61 Bruce L. B en son , T H E  E N T E R P R ISE  OP LAW: JU S T IC E  W I T H O U T  T H E  S T A T E , (San  
Francisco, California: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), p. 282.
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evolves in the same way and  for the same p u rp o se .62 In fact, all of the 
economy and society develops this way and for this purpose.
The fact that different societies throughout history have had different 
customs and have developed different legal systems does not imply that legal 
systems w ould  have been drastically different from each other if they had 
been  allowed to develop  on the free market. From our exam ination  of 
custom ary  legal systems, w e have seen that the basic characteristics and 
p r in c ip le s  of each system  have  been the sam e, toge ther w ith  o the r 
similarities; just as, in spite of minor differences in accents,.people speaking 
the sam e language can unders tand  each other easily — an Englishmen can 
unders tand  an American and a New Yorker can unders tand  a person from 
A labam a.63
The increasing centralization of the law-making process is believed to 
be due  to the increasing transfer of property rights from private individuals to 
g o v e rn m e n t  au th o ri t ie s ,  m ore  accura te ly , to in te res t  g ro u p s .64 This 
uncerta in ty  created by the governm ental legal system 's red is tribu tion  of 
private  property  rights, leads individuals to consume their private properties 
m ore rapidly. Moreover, they spend less time on improving their properties 
and  use their properties less productively. Thus, the bureaucratic legal system 
w ould  create negative externalities for society as resources would be overused 
and  underp roduced . "When negative externalities arise in the process of
62 B ruce L. Benson, "Customary Law W ith Private M eans o f  R eso lv in g  D isp u tes  an d  D isp en s in g  
Justice: A  D escr ip t ion  o f  a M o d ern  S y s tem  of  Law and O rder W ith o u t  State Coercion,"  THE  
J O U R N A L  O F  LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o. 2, Vol. IX, Fall 1991), p. 27.
63 Ibid., p. 28.
64 T erry A n d e r so n  and P. J. Hill ,  T H E  B IR T H  O F  T H E  T R A N S F E R  S O C IE T Y , (S tan ford ,  
California: H o o v er  Institute Press, 1970).
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producing  some good or service, too much of the good or service is being 
produced . This is the case with governm ent p roduction  of laws th rough 
legislation."65
The basic principles of private property and freedom of contract, as we 
have seen, characterize all customary legal systems. We have also seen that 
as such systems evolve, the requ irem ent for the extension of these basic 
principles to cover unanticipated circumstances arises, and custom ary law 
adopts  itself to these changing requirements of the society. A legal system 
developed on the free market or through custom or tradition would have the 
characteristics which I shall examine in this part of the paper.
First of all, unlike most disciplines, law cannot be a discipline free of 
norm ative principles. That is, in such a field, we cannot have a "value-free," 
objective, and positive set of principles which w ould define a set of legal 
rules. Reason cannot merely define legal rules. Law has to evolve, as 
explained earlier, through custom s or traditions, or th rough some sort of 
moral or ethical standards. Consider, for example, tort and criminal law. 
These two types of law are merely a set of prohibitions against the invasion 
of, or aggression against, p rivate  properly  rights. H ow ever, if such laws 
dictate that it is "unlawful" to aggress against the private property of a person,
I
then they automatically assum e that a person's private  property  is a just 
p roperty . Thus, these legal prohibitions are not value-free but a set of 
theories of justice and the just allocation of property rights.66
65 B ruce L. B enson, T H E  E N T E R P R IS E  OP LAW: JU S T IC E  W I T H O U T  T H E  S T A T E , (San  
Francisco, California: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), p. 284.
66 In recent years, h o w ev er ,  s o m e  jurists an d  "Chicago School" e c o n o m is ts  h a v e  tried to d e v e lo p  
s o m e  va lu e - free  theories o f  a llocating  p rivate  property  rights. 1 shall e x a m in e  th ese  theories  
in  m o r e  deta i l  in C hapter  VI.
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As we have examined earlier in the case of noise and air pollution, no 
action can be considered illegal and  an aggression against an individual's  
p rivate  p roperty  right unless it harms him or hinders his enjoym ent of his 
property . We can claim this as a general case for all types of invasions of 
property  rights, and only such actions, thus, should be combated with the full 
pow ers  of the law. Just as we derived our conclusions on noise and air 
po llu tion  from the Lockean theory of just p roperty  (self-ownership and 
homesteading), we can derive similar conclusions for law in general. In fact, 
the concept of self-ownership and homesteading is the justification on which 
the entire system of property rights is based. This principle establishes the 
r igh t of every man to his ow n person, the right of donation , the right of 
bequest (and concomitantly, the right to receive the bequest or inheritance), 
an d  the r igh t of contractual exchange of p roperty  titles.67 Most of the 
criticisms of legal and political theory have centered a round  the failure of 
such theory to pinpoint physical invasion as the only action that should be 
illegal and that justifies the use of legal action to combat it.6**
By this token, just as a person has the right to legally protect his 
p roperty  from physical invasion and to keep that property  from invasion, he 
does not have the right to protect the value of that property, since its value is 
determ ined by what others think of that property and what they are willing to 
pay  for it. Thus, as the law of torts deals with the physical invasion of person
^7 For a d is c u ss io n ,  s ee  M urray N . Rothbard, "Justice and P roperty  Rights," P R O PE R T Y  IN  A  
H U M A N E  E C O N O M Y , S. B lum eni’eld (od.), (I.a Salle, Illinois: O p e n  C ourt P ublish ing  Co., 
1974). S ee  a ls o  Percy B. Lelin ing , "Property Rights, Justice, an d  the  W elfare  State," A C T A  
POLITICA, N o .  15, (Rotterdam , N ether lands:  1980), pp. 323-352.
68  S e e  J o h n  S tu art  M ill ,  "On L iberty ,"  U T I L I T A R I A N I S M ,  L I B E R T Y ,  A N D  
R E P R E S E N T A T I V E  G O V E R N M E N T ,  ( N e w  York: E. P. D u tton  P ublishers ,  1944). See  a lso  
M u rray  N .  R othbard, "F. A. H a y e k  an d  the C o n cep t  of Coercion," O R D O , N o .  31, (Stuttgart, 
G erm any: 1980), pp. 43-50.
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or property, the prohibition of libel and slander is a strange anomaly in tort 
law. It may very well be morally wrong to defame someone's reputation, but 
this defam ation  cannot be enforced under  free m arket or libertarian  law 
because a person 's  reputation  reflects the value other people place on that 
person. A person does not have the right to legally enforce the value of his 
property. W ords or opinions of other people about a person do not constitute 
invasion of a person 's  physical p roperty  right — they merely reflect other 
people's subjective valuations of that person. Thus, outlawing defamation is 
in itself the invasion of the property  right of the person w ho holds such 
defaming opinions.69
It should  be clear that a person has a right to defend himself against 
aggression against his property. But what if, while defending himself from 
aggression, a person violently retaliates and injures an innocent bystander? 
U nder libertarian or free market law, the defender would be held responsible 
for aggressing against the innocent bystander, even if it was accidental, and 
the initial ag g resso r  who p rovoked  the en tire  attack w o u ld  be held 
responsible for aggression against the defender’s property right. The initial 
attacker's liability would be higher than that of the defender. Thus, the rights 
of every party  w ould be upheld and defended. Murray Rothbard sums u p  the 
idea as follows.
"... Anyone has the right to defend his property against an overt act 
initiated against it. He may not move with force against an alleged
69 S e e  R ich ard  A. E p s te in ,  C h a r le s  O. G r e g o r y ,  an d  Harry K a lven  Jr., C A S E S  A N D  
M A T E R IA L S  O N  T O R T S ,  3rd ed it ion ,  (Boston , M assachusetts:  Little B row n & C o.,  1977), pp. 
977-1129.
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aggressor -- a trespasser against his land or chattels -  until the latter 
indicates force by an overt act."711
U nder a libertarian legal system, or a system that is strictly based on
defin ing  private  p ro p e rty  rights, pun ishm en t and  defense have  distinct
definitions. "Punishment is an act of re tribution after the crime has been
committed, and the criminal apprehended, tried, and  convicted."71 On the
other hand, in the process of defense, while the crime is still in progress, the
property  not yet recovered, and the criminal not yet apprehended, the victim
should  be allowed to use all force necessary to prevent the aggressor from
violating his property right.72
What about a situation where it is unclear w hether aggression is being
committed? In such a case it is just not to lake any action and to ensure that
an innocent person is not being coerced -- it is better not to commit aggression
ourse lves .73 Thus, the law should be based on the principle "innocent until
p roven  guilty."
From this reasoning we can deduce that an act would be an act of 
aggression only if it is proven in a court, or in arbitration, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Thus, an act has to be an overt act of aggression. A regulation which 
automatically makes an act "unlawful" without basing it on the principle of 
non-aggression would be illegitimate itself. Such a regulation w ould itself be
79 M u rray  N . Rothbard, "Law, Property  Rights, and Air Pollution," E C O N O M I C S  A N D  T H E  
E N V I R O N M E N T :  A  R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  W alter  E .  B lock  (ed .) ,  (V a n c o u v e r ,  British
C o lu m b ia ,  Canada: T h e  Fraser Institute, 1990), p. 241.
71 Ibid., p. 241.
72 For a d is c u ss io n ,  s e e  W il l iam  L. Prosser, H A N D B O O K  O P  T H E  LAW  O F  T O R T S ,  4th  
e d i t io n ,  (St. Paul, M innesota:  W est  P u blish ing  Co., 1971), pp . 108-125. S ee  a lso  Richard A. 
E pste in , Charles O. G regory , and Harry Kalven Jr., C A SE S A N D  M A T E R IA L S  O N  T O R T S , 3rd 
ed it io n ,  (Boston, M assachusetts:  Little Brown & Co., 1977), p .30.
73 E. W . Cleary (ed.), M C  C O R M IC K 'S  H A N D B O O K  OF T H E  LAW  A N D  E V ID E N C E , 2nd  
ed it io n ,  (St. Paul, Minnesota: W est P ublish ing Co.,  1972), pp. 798-799.
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an aggression against the rights of non-criminals.74 Consider an example 
w here  a builder constructs a structure and it collapses. In such a case, the 
bu ilder w ou ld  be held liable for constructing an unsafe s tructure  by victims 
and  their heirs. H ow ever, if a governm ent au thority  im poses "safety" 
regulations on all builders, then builders who do not intend to build unsafe 
structures and jeopardize people's lives would also be affected by costly legal 
requirem ents  in advance. Similarly, builders who construct structures that 
m eet the set of governm ent requirem ents but which later collapse, w ould  
have "received the advanced im prim atur of the authorities."75
Usually environmental regulations fall in this category of governm ent 
regulations. An act is claimed to be "illegal" even before it is determined that 
it violates another person's property  right or h inders  his enjoyment of his 
private property, "beyond a reasonable doubt." Regulations that require acres 
an d  acres of land to rem ain undeveloped  to "protect the environm ent" 
consti tu te  rules which could be judged as v iolating the rights of no n ­
crim inals.
U n d e r  libertarian or free market law, only the victim of an act of 
aggression, or his heirs or assigns, have the right to press charges against an 
offender. M urray Rothbard explains as follows:
"District a ttorneys or other governm ent officials shou ld  not be 
allow ed to press charges against the wishes of the victim in the 
nam e of 'crimes' against such dubious or nonexistent entities as 
'society' or the 'state.' If, for example, the victim of an assault or a 
theft is a pacifist and refuses to press charges against the criminal, 
no one else should have the right to do so against his wishes. For
74 M urray  N .  Rothbard, "Law, Property  Rights ,  and Air Pollution," E C O N O M I C S  A N D  T H E  
E N V I R O N M E N T :  A  R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  W alter E. B lock  (ed .) ,  ‘(V a n c o u v e r ,  British
C o lu m b ia ,  Canada: T he Fraser Institute, 1990), pp. 257-258.
75 Ibid., p . 258.
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just as a creditor has the right to voluntarily forgive an unpaid  debt, 
so a victim, whether on pacifist grounds or for any other reason, has 
the right to 'forgive' the crime so that the crime is annulled."76
Similarly, a rule which errs in establishing the true aggressor w ould  
also be an act of aggression in itself under a libertarian legal system. One such 
example could be found in the field of product liability. Presently, if a buyer is 
sold a defective product, he can hold the m anufacturer directly liable. The 
proper ru le  under libertarian law would be the "privity rule," which states 
that "the buyer of a defective product can sue only the person with w hom  he 
had  the contract."77 Thus, the buyer would sue the retailer who sold him the 
product. The retailer would sue the wholesaler, and the wholesaler the 
m anufactu rer .78
If free m arket or libertarian law is based on indiv idual rights and  
private property  rights, and if it negates any concept of communal property, 
"society," and  the state, then there would be no crimes against the "society" 
per se. All crimes would be against individuals. As present criminal law is 
based on the prem ise of "crimes against the society," it is publicly imposed. 
U nder libertarian law, however, there would be no criminal law. Since all 
crimes are against individuals, they would all be classified under tort law. 
Rothbard explains as follows.
"However, there is no reason why parts of the law that are now the 
province of criminal law cannot be grafted onto an enlarged law of
76 Ibid., p. 258.
77S ee  Richard A. Epstein , M O D E R N  P R O D U C T  LIA BILITIES LAW, (W estport ,  C onnecticut:  
Q u o r u m  B ooks,  1980), p p .  9-34; and W illiam  L. Prosser, H A N D B O O K .  O F  T H E  L A W  O F  
T O R T S ,  4th ed it ion ,  (St. Paul, Minnesota: W est Publish ing  Co., 1971), pp. 641 ff.
78 M urray  N .  Rothbard, "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution," E C O N O M I C S  A N D  T H E  
E N V I R O N M E N T :  A  R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  W alter  E. Block (ed .) ,  (V a n c o u v e r ,  British
C o lu m b ia ,  Canada: T h e  Fraser Institute, 1990), pp. 258-259.
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torts. For example, restitution to the victim is now considered the 
province of tort law, whereas punishm ent is the realm of criminal 
law. Yet, punitive  dam ages for intentional torts (as opposed  to 
accidents) now generally are aw arded in tort law. It is therefore 
conceivable that more severe punishm ents, such as im prisonment, 
forced labor to repay the victim, or transportation, could be grafted 
into tort law as well."79
M ost unsuccessful a ttem p ts  at invasion of p ro p e r ty  are actually  
successful lesser invasions of person or property . Thus, they should  be 
p rosecu ted  under tort law. For example, "attempted m urder  is usually an 
aggravated assault and battery, attempted armed robbery is usually an assault, 
a ttem pted  car theft or burglary is usually a trespass."8() Even if the attempted 
crime created no aggression against the properly of the victim per se, the fact 
tha t upon  knowing the intent of the offender the victim w ould be subjected 
to fear, would be an assault prosecutable under tort law. Therefore, the only 
offense that would not be prosecutable under tort law would be one which no 
one  w o u ld  know  any th ing  about. But such an offense w ou ld  not be 
prosecuted under any law.
Just as criminal law, u n d e r  a libertarian  legal system, w ou ld  be 
inc luded  in tort law, some offenses classified as criminal w ould  not be 
offenses at all. These are offenses which do not have any victims and cannot 
be proven  to be acts of aggression. Examples are drug  use, prostitution, and 
gambling. While such acts would be considered wrong according to several 
moral and ethical standards, they are acts which involve a person's use of his 
ow n body or property in a way which he sees best. Under a free market legal
79 Ibid., p. 259.
89 R a n d y  E. Barnett, "Restitution: A N e w  Paradigm  of Criminal Justice," A S S E S S I N G  T H E  
C R IM IN A L : R E S T IT U T IO N , R E T R IB U T IO N , A N D  T H E  LEGAL P R O C E S S ,  R. Barnett an d  J. 
H a g e l  (eds .) ,  (C am bridge, M assachusetts:  Ball inger P u b lish in g  Co., 1977), p. 376.
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system, few people  would be willing to pay to prosecute these "offenses" 
which have no victims. "People who want to control other people's lives are 
rarely eager to pay for the privilege. They usually expect to be paid  for the 
service they prov ide  for the ’victims’."81 Under a free m arket legal system, 
such acts w ould  be illegal only if a society believes that such acts are causing 
harm  to innocent victims by people indulg ing  in such activities; in which 
case the society w ould be willing to pay to enforce laws against such acts.
W hat abou t a situation in w hich there are several o ffenders  or 
aggressors? H ow  are offenders in such a case to be held liable? The answer to 
these questions is that offenders could be compulsorily joined together "only 
w hen  all parties acted in concert in a joint tortious enterprise."82 It has also 
been proposed under libertarian law that the "joint aggressors" could be held 
equally liable for the entire amount of the damages. Otherwise, the damages 
could be apportioned according to "the separate causal actions contributed by 
each defendant."83
Similarly, if there is m ore than one victim in a legal suit, it is 
appropriate  under  libertarian law to have these plaintiffs join together against 
the offender (or offenders) in a "class action" suit. H ow ever, in such a 
situation the only way the class action suit could be filed is w hen every 
plaintiff in the suit agrees to sue for damages. A class action suit cannot 
represent citizens who have not even heard of the case or are not interested
81 D a v id  F r ie d m a n ,  T H E  M A C H I N E R Y  O F  F R E E D O M : G U I D E  T O  A  R A D I C A L
C A P IT A L IS M , (La Salle, Illinois: O p en  Court P u blish ing  Co.,  1989), p. 129.
82 M urray  N . Rothbard, "Law, Property  Rights, and Air Pollution," E C O N O M I C S  A N D  TH E  
E N V I R O N M E N T :  A  R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  W a lle r  H. B lock  (ed .) ,  (V a n c o u v e r ,  British
C o lu m b ia ,  Canada: T h e  Fraser Institute, 199(1), p. 2ol).
83 Ibid., p. 261.
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in suing, as is generally done today. "Thus, it would not be permissible for 50 
residents of Los Angeles to file a pollution suit on behalf of the class of 'all 
citizens of Los Angeles' w ithout their know ledge or express consent."84 As 
established earlier, only the victim or his heirs or assigns should be allowed 
to file a suit against the offender. Thus, class action suits should  not be 
allowed except where every plaintiff actively and voluntarily joins in the suit, 
and  where common interests prevail over separate or individuals ones.
Under a free market legal system, offenses are punished through fines 
payable to the victim. We saw this in our analysis of customary legal systems 
w here  p u n ishm en t was in the form of a m onetary  unit or a piece of 
transferable property. The offender would not only be required to pay the 
victim for his damages, but would also bear the costs of the trial.
This form of pun ishm ents  is more efficient than the p resen t form, 
which is imprisonment, w here the cost of im prisonm ent is born by common 
citizens and the prisoner's time is wasted. Moreover, as the offender would 
bear the cost of trials under  a libertarian legal system, he w ould  have an 
incentive not to waste the court's time.85 It w ould also encourage out-of- 
court settlements which would put less burden on the court system. Out-of- 
court settlements in a libertarian legal system would  not be like the plea 
bargaining situations today, where the offender bargains with the "public" 
prosecutor to get a lesser sentence if he admits to a lesser crime. The bargains 
w ould  be between the victim and the offender.86
84 Ibid., p. 262.
85 Bruce L. Benson, "Customary Law With Private M eans of R eso lv in g  D isp u tes  an d  D isp en s in g  
Justice: A D e sc r ip t io n  o f  a M o d e r n  S y s tem  o f  L aw  an d  O rd er  W ith o u t  State  C oercion ,"  
J O U R N A L  O F  LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o. 2, Vol. IX, Fall 1990, pp. 28, 29.
86 Ibid.,  p. 29.
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Fines are of different degrees for different offenses under  free market 
law. As w e saw  in the case of m edieval Iceland, fines were high enough, 
according to the offense, to deter crime. Moreover, the fine for a m urder  was 
m uch larger than that for a killing. As noticed in most of our examples of 
custom ary  legal systems, and medieval Iceland in particular, the victim's 
right to restitution, for violation of his property, was transferable. Thus, such 
a system w ould  make sure that the victim of aggression is p rov ided  with 
restitu tion.
W hat w ould  compel offenders to pay fines under a free m arket legal 
system? As we have seen in our analysis of customary law, it is usually the 
threat of ostracism and disownm enl, and the reciprocal na ture  of the legal 
system. There would always be outlaws, just as there are ou tlaw s in our 
present legal structure (more in our societies than in primitive societies), but 
a free m arket legal system im plem ented today would pose a bigger threat 
against ou tlaw ry  due to the presence of high technology, com m unications 
and  com puter  linkage systems, and credit-rating agencies.87 Moreover, in 
today 's  complex societies hum an relationships and transactions are  more 
im portant than in primitive societies, and the threat of ostracism from society 
w ould  be a greater deterrent to outlawry.
87 Ibid., p . 37.
CHAPTER VI 
CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS
James B uchanan asks the following questions: If gov e rn m en t is
dism antled  how w ould rights reemerge and com m and respect? H ow  w ould 
laws gain the respect for legitimacy from citizens? He believes that a social 
contract or constitu tion w ould  arise from the collective action w hich is 
necessary in a society. This social contract w ould  establish and  define the 
r igh ts  of people  and  establish the institu tions to enforce these righ ts .88 
H owever, custom ary or libertarian law develops on the free market, through 
a society's customs and traditions, and it is its reciprocal nature that provides 
the  basis for its recognition. Similarly, the institu tions to enforce these 
property  rights usually also evolve through the reciprocal benefits on the free 
market. "Cooperation does not require collective (governmental) action."89
A CRITIQUE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL'S 
IDEAS ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
As m entioned  earlier, the field of law cannot be value-free and legal 
theory  m ust have som e norm ative  basis. H ow ever, the en tire  idea of
88  Jam es B u c h a n a n ,  "Before P u b lic  Choice,"  E X P L O R A T I O N S  IN  T H E  T H E O R Y  O F  
A N A R C H Y ,  (Blacksburg, Virginia: C enter  for the S tu d y  o f  P ublic  C hoice , 1972), p. 37.
89 Bruce L. B enson , "Custom ary L aw  With Private M eans o f  R eso lv in g  D isp u tes  and  D isp e n s in g  
Justice: A D escr ip t ion  o f  a M o d ern  System  of  Law and O rder W ith o u t  State Coercion," TH E  
JO U R N A L  O F  LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o .  2, Vol. IX, Fall 1990, p. 26.
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property  rights and ethics of the Chicago School of economics is based on the 
premise that it does not matter how property rights are assigned. As long as 
some property  rights are assigned, in the case of conflicting interests of two 
parties, resources w ould be allocated as efficiently as possible. The biggest 
nam e in the Chicago School's ideas on law and economics is Ronald Coase. 
In his fam ous article "The Problem of Social Cost," Ronald Coase uses the 
example of a railroad locomotive blighting nearby farms and  orchards. Coase 
called this act an "externality" w hich had  to be "internalized" if "social 
efficiency" was to be achieved.90
According to Coase, it does not matter if the farmer has a property right 
to the orchards and the farms and should hold the railroad responsible for the 
dam age, or if the railroad has the right to emit the sm oke and the farmer 
should  bribe the railroad to install a smoke prevention device. Resources 
w ould  be allocated such that total wealth would be maxim ized under either 
allocation of property  rights. Coase's example continues as follows. The 
farmer's dam age is, say, $100,000 and in Case I the farmer owns the property. 
Then he could hold the railroad liable to pay $100,000 to him. In Case 2, 
w here  the railroad has the p roperty  right to emit the smoke, the farmer 
w ou ld  pay  a bribe of up  to $100,000 to the railroad to install a sm oke 
prevention device (SPD).
U nder the conditions of Case 1, if the SPD costs $80,000, the railroad 
will install it instead of paying the farmer damages of $100,000. U nder the 
conditions of Case 2, the farmer w ould be willing to pay the railroad the 
$80,000 to install the SPD as it w ould  thus be able to save $100,000 worth of
90 R on ald  C oase ,  "The Problem  of  Social Cost," JO U R N A L  O F  LAW A N D  E CO NO M IC S, N o .  
1, O ctober  1961.
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crops. Therefore, the SPD would be installed and the crops w ould be saved no 
m atter how  the property rights are assigned. If the SPD costs, say $120,000, 
then under the conditions of Case 1, the railroad would keep pouring  out the 
smoke and  paying the farmer dam ages of $100,000 instead of installing the 
SPD for $120,000. Under the conditions of Case 2, the farmers w ould  not 
choose to pay  the railroad $120,000 to install the SPD so that $100,000 worth of 
p roperty  could be saved. Thus, under any kind of allocation of property  
rights, the  SPD w ould  not be installed. Coase states that the above 
conclusions w ould  only be true in the absence of transaction costs.
Coase does not point out ano ther condition under  which the above 
conclusion w ou ld  not be true — if we take into account any psychic or 
psychological factors. Obviously, if the farmer has a personal attachm ent to 
the orchard  and  the farms, or if he has a large psychic income attached to 
them, $100,000 may not be enough to compensate for their destruction. What 
if the farm er requires a million dollars in com pensation due  to his psychic 
attachment to the orchards and the farms? Obviously, the railroad would not 
be willing to pay the am ount and the Coasian argument would  break dow n.91
A nother problem with the Coasian theorem is that costs are almost 
impossible to measure objectively when transaction costs are included in the 
analysis. Coase states that w hen transaction costs are taken into account, 
p roperty  rights should be assigned in o rder to be m inim ize total ("social") 
cost. But costs are subjective and may not be measurable in m onetary terms. 
Thus, there may be no way of m easuring which allocation of property  rights
91 M urray  N .  Rothbard, "Law Property  Rights , and  Air Pollution,"  E C O N O M I C S  A N D  T H E  
E N V I R O N M E N T :  A R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  W a lter  E. B lock  (ed .) ,  (V a n c o u v e r ,  British
C o lu m b i a ,  C anada: T h e  Fraser Institute, 1990), p. 235. S ee  a lso  W alter E. B lock  "Coase and  
D e m s e tz  o n  P r ivate  Property  Rights," THE J O U R N A L  O F  LIBER TAR IA N  ST U D IE S, N o .  2, 
Vol. 1, Fall 1977.
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will minimize costs.92 Yet another problem  with the Coasian a rgum en t 
arises when we consider that the farmer may not be able to afford to pay the 
railroad anything. Demsetz, another p roponent of these ideas pioneered by 
Coase, gives the example of a person entering the military. He states that it 
does not m atter w hether a person enlists in the arm y on his own and is paid 
for it or he is drafted and has to bribe the tax-payers to get out of the military, 
the sam e people  w ou ld  be recruited  in the a rm y .93 In such a case, the 
argum ent of the victim not having enough to pay for the bribe is even more 
apparent.94
The argum ents  of Coase and Demsetz seem even m ore im plausible  
w hen we measure their argum ents on ethical and moral grounds. A person 
has the right to his homesteaded property  and, in Demsetz's example, to his 
body. A second person cannot come in, invade it and expect the victim to 
bribe him  to stop the aggression. In the case of Demsetz, a person who has the 
right to his body cannot be kidnapped (drafted) and  then be given the option 
of buying himself out (pay a ransom).95 Any such transaction is unethical. 
Demsetz uses another example. He states that the success of a new product 
does not depend, in the absence of exchange and police costs, on whether the 
producers of that p roduct are assigned the right to sell that product w ithout 
com pensating  com petitors  who are hurt or w hether the com petitors  are 
allowed to retain their old customers.
92 Ibid., p. 236.
qq
H aro ld  D e m z c t z ,  " T ow a rd s  a T h eo ry  o f  P rop erty  Rights," A M E R IC A N  E C O N O M IC  
REVIEW, Vol. 57, M ay  1967.
94
W alter  E. B lock., "Coase an d  D e m se tz  o n  P rivate  P rop erty  Rights," T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  
LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o .  2, Vol. 1, Fall 1977, p. 112.
95 Ibid., p. 112.
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The major problem with this example is once again the same. If we 
take into account psychic income, the theorem will break down. Moreover, 
p roducers  do  not have the right to retain their customers. Producers ow n 
w hat they produce but do not own the value of that property . The value of 
the p ro d u c t  is w hat consum ers think of it and  how  m uch  they like the 
product. The producer has no control over it.96 Similarly, every producer 
has the right to compete with other producers and no producer has the right 
to stop this competition.97
In the case of high transaction costs, Demsetz holds that court decision 
and the allocation of property  rights are essential for an "optimal" allocation 
of resources. Just like Coase, Demsetz holds that the objective in such a 
s itua tion  w ould  be the m inim ization  of total (social) costs. In Coase's 
example, if transaction costs or the costs of negotiations are $200,000, then if 
"the judges decide in favor of the farmer the device will be installed not 
because it will not pay the manufacturer to bribe the farmer into accepting the 
smoke -- bu t because if will be too expensive to negotiate the bribe."98 The 
courts directly influence economic activity when m arket transactions are so 
costly as to make it difficult to change the arrangem ent of rights established by 
the law.99 *
Coase's basic point is that the courts should rule in favor of that party 
which is unable to be bribed, in the absence of transaction costs. The courts
96 Ibid., p. 112.
97 Ibid p. 112.
98 Ibid p. 113
99 R o n a ld  C o a se ,  "The P rob lem  of Socia l Cost," J O U R N A L  O F  L AW  A N D  E C O N O M IC S ,  
sect ion  VII, N o .  1, October 1961, p. 19.
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should give the railroad the right to emit smoke if the cost of installing the 
SPD is greater than the loss to the farmer. The problem is that even if the 
courts could determine objectively w hether a m utual transaction could occur 
between the victim and the aggressor, the act of determ ining the efficient 
allocation w ould  cause too much uncertainty in the legal process. This may 
actually h inder economic activity. Moreover, the judges who will be elected 
through the political process, are very likely to make mistakes in determ ining 
the m axim um  benefit or m inim um  cost allocations which w ould  take a 
tremendous am ount of skill.100 The uncertainty of the legal system created by 
following Coase's and  Demsetz's advice w ou ld  d iscourage  ou t of court 
settlements and pu t more burden on the court system.101
Finally, as poin ted  out earlier, the solutions of the Chicago School 
become void if we weigh them against ethics and morals. "It is evil and  
vicious to violate our most cherished and precious property  right in an ill 
conceived attem pt to maximize the monetary value of production."102
SOME ADDITIONAL CRITICISMS 
OF PRESENT LAW
In today's legal environment, the distinction between criminal law and 
civil law has led the courts to establish a more lenient and loose criterion for 
guilt in civil cases, and an extremely severe criterion for criminal cases. At 
present, the "preponderance of evidence" criterion is used to prove guilt in
100 vValter E. Block, "Coase an d  D e m se tz  on  Private  P rop erty  Rights" THE J O U R N A L  O F  
LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, N o .  2, Vol. 1, Fall 1977, p. 114.
101 Ibid., p. 114.
102 Ibid., p. 115.
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civil cases, w hich means that if there is m erely a 51% chance of the 
defendant's guilt, he can be held liable. This puts a larger burden of proof on 
the defendan t to prove innocence. For criminal cases, however, a stiffer 
criterion for guilt is used.103
This difference in the criteria of proving guilt is purely  based on the 
degree of punishm ent. Under libertarian law this w ould  not be the case. 
Criteria  for de te rm in ing  guilt w ou ld  no t be based  on the degree  of 
punishm ent. Defendants w ould  be p rov ided  as m uch protection in civil 
cases as they would in criminal cases. The criterion for determ ining guilt for 
all cases w ould  be a clear, strong, and convincing proof of guilt, beyond a 
re a so n a b le  d o u b t .104 "What the plaintiff m ust prove, then, beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a strict causal connection between the defendant and  his 
aggression against the plaintiff."105
Another practice that is very common in today's legal systems, and is 
totally unacceptable under libertarian law, is that of "vicarious liability." 
Vicarious liability holds that if A is an employee of B and if A commits a 
crime, then B w ould be held liable for it as well as long as the crime is 
committed by A in the course of furthening, even if only in part, B's business. 
This is held regardless of whether B knew of A's intent. The only exception is 
w hen  A goes on a frolic of his ow n unconnec ted  w ith  B's business. 
Supporters of this law include such champions of free m arket legal theory as 
Richard A. Epstein. Weighing this theory against our principles of property
103 M urray  r\[. Rothbard, "Law, Property  Rights and Air Pollution," E C O N O M I C S  A N D  T H E  
E N V I R O N M E N T :  A  R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  W alter  E. Block (ed .) ,  (V a n c o u v e r ,  British  
C olu m b ia ,  Canada: T h e  Fraser Institute, 1990), p. 243.
104 Ibid., p. 243.
105 Ibid., p. 244.
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rights, the just theory of property, and ethics, the flaw in the theory can easily 
be seen. H ow  can B be held responsible for A's crime if he neither knew 
about it or had any part in it? B w ould  only be liable if it can be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in the crime in the sense that 
he encouraged it, knew about it, or if it is done by A while perform ing a duty 
for B with B's prior knowledge.
Proponents of the theory of vicarious liability hold that if the employer 
benefits from the gains from his worker's activities, he should  also share the 
losses.106 The problem with this statement is that it fails to appreciate that the 
employer is already risking a loss by hiring the employee. He may be stuck 
w ith  an incompetent employee and may have already m ade expenditures in 
training the employee. In such a case the em ployer will lose the am ount 
spent in the training. Moreover, the employer may not be able to fetch a price 
which is at least equal to the cost of producing the good produced  by the 
employee, and may incur a loss.107 Furthermore, the producer or employer 
pays the employee before he sells the product. Thus, he pays the employee 
now  an d  receives his re turn  in the future (with a risk factor involved of 
w hether he will receive enough return). Thus the benefits from the gains 
from the employee's work are not only returns for the risk associated with 
hiring the employee but also a paym ent for the time value of the re turn  
earned in the future. Therefore, the employer has already borne his fair share 
of risks and  should not further be held liable for the employee's offense.
106 R ichard A. E pste in , "Crime an d  Tort: O ld  W in e  in O ld  Bottles," A S S E S S I N G  T H E  
C R IM IN A L : R E S T IT U T IO N , R E T R IB U T IO N  A N D  T H E  LEG AL P R O C E SS,"  R Barnett an d  J. 
H a g e l  (eds .) ,  (C am bridge, M assachusetts:  Ballinger P ublish ing Co., 1977), p. 707.
107 M urray  N .  Rothbard, "Law, Property  R ights  and Air Pollution" E C O N O M I C S  A N D  T H E  
E N V I R O N M E N T :  A R E C O N C I L I A T I O N ,  W alter  E. B lock, (ed .) ,  (V a n c o u v e r ,  British  
C olu m b ia ,  Canada: T he Fraser Institute, 1990), p. 247.
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CONCLUSION
The point that I have a ttem pted to make throughout the course of this 
paper is that a system which defines and enforces private property  rights is 
essential for the functioning, in fact the existence, of a free market economy. 
The only way we can ensure  a legal system that w ou ld  enforce private 
p ro p e rty  rights and be com patible  with the free m arket is if it evolved 
th rough the custom and tradition of society. Such a legal system w ould be 
volun tarily  adopted  as much as possible, by most people, as it w ould  be 
developed by themselves. Thus, such a system w ould require less force to 
enforce and would rely more on positive reinforcements, such as reciprocity. 
I a ttem pted  to prove this point by s tudying  examples of legal systems at 
different points in history which have developed in this way. We noticed 
that each one of our examples had the common characteristic of relying on 
positive reinforcements for the enforcement of the law, and  all were deeply 
rooted in the enforcement of private property rights.
f
I have also attempted to prove, through the course of this paper, that a 
system of private property  rights can be justified on the basis of ethics. I 
examined the nature of such an ethical system of private property  rights and 
presented  some criticisms of some of the prominent legal theories practiced 
today. I w ouid  thus conclude by making the following observation. If a 
system of private property rights is essential for a market economy and if the 
key to economic growth is a free m arket economy (as is w idely believed 
today), then the only way economic growth can be achieved is by defining and 
enforcing private property rights.
The reason we see problems in developing nations today is because 
they have not grasped the notion of private property. An apparent example is
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the fo rm er Soviet U nion  and o th e r  ex -com m unis t Eastern  E uropean  
countries. The socialist bloc, and the former Soviet Union in particular, have 
been supposedly  attem pting for years to bring in "free m arket reforms" bu t 
they have not worked. The simple reason: the "former" socialists have not 
grasped  the concept of private property. Ever since private property  rights 
were abolished by the initial implem entation of com m unism , they have not 
been re-established. Until they are re-established a free m arke t cannot 
emerge. Thus, the key to economic developm ent is the enforcem ent of 
private property rights and au tonom y.108
108 S ee  N a th a n  R osen berg  a n d  L. E. B irdzell Jr., H O W  T H E  W E S T  G R E W  RICH : T H E
E C O N O M IC  T R A N S F O R M A T I O N  OF T H E  IN D U S T R IA L  W O R L D , ( N e w  York: Basic Books,  
Inc., Publishers, 1986).
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